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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates stock market reactions surrounding the announcement of actual 
share buybacks by companies listed on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia from 2007 
through 2011. An event study methodology was used to examine stock price reactions to 
100 announcements of share buybacks involving 100 different listed companies. The 
market-adjusted return model (MARM) was used to capture the abnormal returns as 
share buybacks mostly involved actively traded companies. Overall, the CAAR, which 
was used to measure the wealth effect, showed an uptrend, but was not statistically 
significant for about 12 days after the event day before stabilising. This showed a 
positive wealth effect arising from the announcement. Thus, one can weakly conclude 
that the market generally responded favourably to the announcement of share buybacks. 
The evidence tends to support the signalling hypothesis and is consistent with the under 
valuation hypothesis. 
 
JEL Classification: G14, G34 
 
Keywords: Share Buybacks, Signalling, Abnormal returns, Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns 
 
INTRODUCTION 
It has now become common practice for publicly listed companies in Malaysia to buy 
back their own shares on the open market. Being convinced of the many benefits that 
can be derived from these buybacks, companies that once were perceived as 
conservative have also embarked on these share buyback programmes. 
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Two common methods that companies use to buy back their own shares are the 
single-price tender offer buyback and the open market buyback. Tender offer buybacks 
are executed using a fixed-price tender offer (Dann, 1981). Open market buybacks 
involve buying back small quantities of shares through a broker in the open market. The 
open market buyback is more flexible than a tender offer and often takes longer. Our 
study focuses on open market buybacks as only open market buybacks are allowed in 
Bursa Malaysia under the Malaysian legal framework (Ramakrishnan, Ravindran & 
Ganesan, 2007). 
 
Share buybacks have long been allowed in the developed markets and, therefore, 
many studies have been conducted in these markets (Ikenberry, Lakonishok & 
Vermaelen, 1995; Chan, Ikenberry & Lee, 2004; Grullon & Michaely, 2004). These 
studies examined, among other topics, the reasons for buybacks and market reactions to 
buybacks or buyback announcements. In view of the differences in buyback laws and 
regulations and the maturity and size of the developed markets, these results might not 
be relevant to the Malaysian market. Furthermore, within the Malaysian market, studies 
in this area have been rare (Isa, Ghani & Lee, 2011). For example, we found only a few 
published studies on share buybacks in the Malaysian market: Isa, Ghani and Lee 
(2011), Wong, Lim and Chong (2011), Ramakhrisnan et al. (2007), Shahar and 
Abdullah (2007) and Lim and Bacha (2002). In view of the scarcity of empirical 
research on share buybacks in Malaysia, we hope our study will update and enrich the 
current literature on share buybacks. Thus, the objective of this study is to analyse the 
reaction of the share price pursuant to an announcement of share buybacks by 
companies listed on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia Securities Bhd (BMSB) for 
2007 through 2011. The organisation of this paper is as follows: (a) an overview of 
share buybacks in Malaysia, (b) previous research on share buybacks worldwide, 
including Malaysia, (c) data and methodology and (d) findings and implications of the 
study. 
 
Overview of Share Buybacks in Malaysia 
Prior to September 1997, companies in Malaysia were not allowed to deal in their own 
shares. Section 67 of the Companies Act 1965 prohibits a company from holding in its 
name any of its issued share capital. The prohibition also extends to the giving of 
financial assistance to any person, whether directly or indirectly, and whether by means 
of a loan, guarantee or the provision of security or otherwise, for the purpose of dealing 
in the company’s own shares. In September 1997, the provisions of Section 67 of the 
Act were affected by insertion of a new Section 67A. For the first time in Malaysia, this 
section allows a publicly traded company to buy back its own shares or to give financial 
assistance to any person for the purpose of purchasing its shares. When section 67A of 
the Companies Act 1965 was first introduced, it required the cancellation of shares 
repurchased and an amount equivalent to the nominal value of the shares cancelled to be 
transferred to a capital redemption reserve. This effectively precluded use of the treasury 
stock method of accounting for share buybacks. However, the Companies (Amendment) 
(No. 2) Act 1998, passed in parliament in October 1998, allows share buybacks to be 
retained as treasury shares (Tan, 2009). 
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According to Section 67A (as amended), the following conditions must be met before a 
share buyback can be executed by a publicly listed company: 
(a) it is solvent at the date of the purchase and will not become insolvent by 
incurring the debts involved in the obligation to pay for the shares so purchased; 
(b) the purchase is made through the Malaysian Stock Exchange on which the shares 
of the company are quoted and in accordance with the rules of the Stock 
Exchange; and 
(c) the purchase is made in good faith and in the interests of the company. 
According to the amended subsection (3A) of Section 67A of the Companies Act 1965, 
a publicly listed company that has bought back its own shares is allowed: 
(a) to cancel the shares so purchased; 
(b) to retain the shares so purchased in treasury shares, or 
(c) to retain part of the shares so purchased as treasury shares and cancel the 
remainder, according to the company’s needs. 
Furthermore, according to subsection (3B) of Section 67A, a publicly listed company 
that has bought back its own shares may: 
(a) distribute the treasury shares as dividends to shareholders or 
(b) in accordance with the rules of the stock exchange, resell the treasury shares on 
the market of the stock exchange on which the shares are quoted. 
 
In summary, the amendment to Section 67A has provided further flexibility to 
publicly listed companies in allowing shares repurchased to be held as treasury shares, 
which subsequently can either be distributed as share dividends to shareholders or 
reissued by resale in the open market. Additionally, the amendment allows for the 
consideration of the shares repurchased to be offset against the share premium account 
(MASB, 2004). 
 
Motivation for Share Buybacks 
Studies in the US and other developed economies have shown that share buybacks are 
prompted by various and often interrelated motives. Some of the reasons or motives for 
share buybacks are discussed below. 
 
(a) Signalling Hypothesis 
One of the most influential motivators for share buybacks by companies is the 
signalling hypothesis. However, in an efficient market, share buybacks are 
unlikely to influence the share price. Advocates of the efficient market would 
argue that the share price of a company is fairly priced in the market. Thus, any 
repurchase by the company is simply a means of transferring a certain value (in 
cash terms) of the company to the selling shareholders for the fair value of their 
shares. Accordingly, there should be no effect on the value of the remaining 
shares in issue. 
If the signalling hypothesis is true, then an inference which can be made 
is that the market’s initial assessment of information is likely to be imperfect due 
to information asymmetry between management and outside investors. 
Logically, one can assume that the management has better information about a 
firm’s current and sustainable future earnings. The management announces a 
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share buyback when it perceives that its shares are undervalued compared to the 
shares’ intrinsic value. So, in times of depressed stock market prices, share 
buybacks provide an avenue for companies to take advantage of investment 
opportunities to buy back their shares at low prices. Hence, the announcement of 
a share buyback serves to communicate or signal the market regarding the 
management’s belief that the company’s value is higher than the current 
depressed market price suggests. 
 
(b) Free Cash Flow Hypothesis 
The next most influential motivator for share buybacks by companies is the free 
cash flow hypothesis. Companies can buy back their own shares when they have 
surplus cash and are unable to find investment assets with lucrative returns 
(Grullon & Ikenberry, 2000; Jensen, 1986). The purpose is to use up the surplus 
cash to prevent the management from investing in unprofitable projects. Oswald 
and Young (2004) argued that management used share buybacks as a mean to 
distribute surplus cash while at the same time taking advantage of investment 
opportunities to buy back their own shares which were perceived to be 
undervalued. In addition, management may choose share buybacks over 
dividends as a mean to distribute surplus cash due to the flexibility of the former, 
which will be discussed in part (f) on the dividend substitution hypothesis. 
 
(c) Prevent EPS Dilution Hypothesis 
Other motives of share buybacks include the prevention of earnings per share 
(EPS) dilution. EPS is equal to profits after taxes divided by the number of 
shares outstanding. EPS will increase if the number of shares in the denominator 
is reduced. When stock options are issued to employees, a potential dilution to 
EPS occurs. In general, studies have shown that stock option programmes are 
related to increased share purchases and decreased earnings retention 
(Weisbenner, 2001). Furthermore, large companies execute a gradual buyback of 
shares to neutralise the dilution of EPS caused by the exercising of stock options 
(Weisbenner, 2001). The decision to buy back should be related to options 
recently exercised and to options expected to be exercised in the foreseeable 
future (Kahle, 2002). The option-funding hypothesis predicts that share 
buybacks are intended to finance the exercise of employee stock options. Since 
only a small amount of shares per transaction is being bought back on the open 
market, there may not be a large change in the denominator to affect EPS. 
 
(d) Optimal Capital Structure 
Share buybacks have the effect of increasing a company’s gearing ratio. Holding 
the debt capital constant, any shares repurchased will reduce the shareholders’ 
equity in the financial statements and thus increase the debt-to-equity ratio. The 
effect of an increase in the debt-to-equity ratio holds true even if gearing is 
measured on the market value basis. In this case, the market value of the 
company’s equity may decrease by the extent of the cash outflow after the 
repurchase.  
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The optimal leverage hypothesis was proposed to explain abnormal 
returns during buyback announcements (Vermaelen, 1981). If a company’s 
gearing is low, increased use of debt capital will increase the interest tax shield, 
which may lower its cost of capital and thereby lead to an increase in the 
company’s value (Skjeltorp & Segaard, 2004). Thus, the management can use 
share buybacks to move towards the company’s optimal capital structure and to 
lower the cost of capital. On the other hand, if a company’s gearing is already 
high, share buybacks will likely increase the cost of capital. Thus, when a 
company’s gearing is low, the leverage hypothesis predicts that if a share 
buyback is financed by debt capital, the equity shares’ value may increase by the 
present value of the tax-savings on interest accrued to the equity holders (Tan, 
2009). 
 
(e) Takeover Defence Hypothesis 
The management entrenchment hypothesis argues that when managements 
embarks on a share buyback, members of management are acting in their own 
interests at the expense of shareholders (Lamba & Ramsay, 2000). Under this 
hypothesis, share buybacks can be exploited as a defensive tactic against hostile 
takeovers by increasing the company’s leverage. This would make the target of 
the takeover less attractive. At the same time, it would also reduce the number of 
shares available to potential offerors. The shareholders’ interest hypothesis 
argues that when managers undertake share buybacks as a defence against 
hostile takeovers, they are acting in the interest of shareholders. If managers are 
constantly faced with threats of hostile takeovers, they may adopt a short-term 
focus with respect to their investment decisions, which may not be in the 
interests of shareholders. Through a share buyback, the threat of a hostile 
takeover may be reduced as the number of shares available to the public and 
potential offerors would be reduced, thereby allowing managers to focus on 
strategic and long-term investment decisions that are in the interests of 
shareholders (Tan, 2009). 
 
(f)  Dividend Substitution Hypothesis 
Dividend payment is a very important element to attract prospective investors to 
invest in a company’s shares. Since dividends are under the close examination of 
the market, managements are very careful with their dividend payout policy. 
They are less likely to increase dividends if the increase cannot be sustained in 
the future. Likewise, managements are also less likely to lower the dividends due 
to the adverse signal that it can send to the market. Thus, management may 
choose to distribute the temporary excess cash flow in the form of a share 
buyback rather than distributing an increased cash dividend that cannot be 
sustained in the future. Furthermore, due to signalling effects, companies should 
not amend their dividend policy often as doing so affects investors’ confidence 
in the company and, as a result, may negatively affect its cost of equity and share 
price. To resolve this issue, a company can maintain a low dividend policy to 
avoid constraining the cash flow needed for its daily operating activities and use 
the share buyback to distribute excess cash (Bhattacharya & Dittmar, 2004; 
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Weigand, 2005). This method provides regular dividends and at the same time 
distributes excess cash to shareholders. 
 
(g) Earnings Management 
Managements that have insider information may also use share buybacks for 
window-dressing purposes. Studies have shown that share buybacks can be used 
by companies experiencing slowdowns to conceal detrimental results with 
respect to financial indicators such as EPS (Chan, Ikenberry, Lee & Wange, 
2010; Li & McNally, 2003). However, as mentioned earlier, the effect is likely 
to be trivial as the given current maximum limit of 10 percent of the issued share 
capital allowable for share buybacks is usually executed in small quantities in the 
open market. 
 
Evidence from Overseas Markets 
In the overseas context, studies conducted by Vermaelen (1981) and Dann (1981) on US 
open market repurchases found that on average share prices increased by approximately 
3 percent. However, for tender offer repurchases, both Dann (1981) and Vermaelen 
(1981) indicated that the positive response was much higher with an average price 
increase of about 16 percent and between 13.3 percent and 17.9 percent, respectively, in 
the analysis of cumulative average abnormal return for a period of 60 days after the 
tender offers were announced. Furthermore, Vermaelen’s (1981) findings suggested that 
the price increase was not temporary but tended to last well after the repurchases and 
concluded that, on average, there was a permanent rise in share price for companies that 
repurchased their own shares. 
 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) studied long-run firm performance 
following open market share buyback announcements from 1980 through 1990. Their 
results showed an abnormal four-year buy-and-hold return of 12.1 percent on average 
after the initial announcement. An average abnormal return of 54.3 percent was found 
for value stocks where companies were more likely to repurchase their shares due to 
undervaluation. As for glamour stocks where undervaluation was less likely to be an 
important motive, no positive drift in abnormal returns was observed when repurchases 
were announced. The study also showed that the market erred in its initial response and 
appeared to ignore the information signalled through buyback announcements with 
respect to value stocks. 
 
Chan, Ikenberry and Lee (2001) examined buyback announcements by focusing 
on whether the stocks bought back by the managers were consistent with the increased 
shareholders’ value. Generally, when managers bought back their shares, the long-
horizon return drifts following repurchase announcements were higher, consistent with 
the undervaluation hypothesis. A high abnormal performance for purchase companies 
with high free cash flow was evident. However, mixed results were found for the overall 
support for this hypothesis. 
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Oswald and Young (2004) surveyed the impact of agency problems on payout 
decisions and excess cash’s role in explaining actual open market share buybacks. Using 
data from the UK, they found that buyback activity clustered in the cash-generative 
industries was rare where investment opportunities were available. They also found that 
abnormally high cash flows from investing and operating activities drove both the 
amount spent reacquiring shares and the probability of a buyback. The buyback 
companies reported improvements in post-repurchase operating performance. The 
findings also showed that managers used share buybacks as a flexible tool for 
distributing temporary cash surpluses. 
 
Koerniadi et al. (2007) investigated the stock market reactions to both on-market 
and off-market share buyback programmes in New Zealand for 1995 through 2004. In 
New Zealand, share buybacks had become common during those years, although the 
number and size of buybacks were small. This was mainly due to the presence of the 
dividend imputation system, which diminished the tax consequences of cash dividends 
compared with capital gains. Overall, the market reacted favourably and significantly to 
share buyback announcements. On the announcement day, the on- and off-market 
buybacks had average abnormal returns of 3.25 percent and 3.12 percent, respectively. 
The reasons companies executed share buybacks were also consistent with the 
investment and free cash flow agency hypotheses. 
 
However, in Australia, an empirical study conducted by Harris and Ramsay 
(1995) revealed that the share returns of companies announcing buybacks appeared to 
have little impact on subsequent earnings. The results indicated that the information 
signalling explanation for share buybacks could not, without further study, be supported 
for buybacks by Australian companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. 
 
In India, Hyderabad (2009) found an average announcement return of 3 percent 
to 3.5 percent. The study was intended to test the signalling ability of buybacks in the 
Indian context. The market reaction in India was relatively higher than in the US and the 
UK. This indicated a greater degree of information asymmetry and the Indian capital 
markets were more undervalued. The year-wise movement in AAR and CAR was also 
analysed and CAR was lower in years with both a lower and higher number of buyback 
announcements. This independence of CAR to number of buyback announcements 
indicates that CAR was explained by other factors. An analysis of buyback methods 
showed that open market repurchases had greater signalling ability than fixed-price 
tender offers in the Indian context, contradicting the result found in the US context. 
 
Evidence from Malaysian Market 
In the Malaysian context, Lim and Bacha (2002) analysed 131 observations from the 
large listed companies (Main Board) and small listed companies (Second Board) that 
announced share buybacks over a period of four years. The findings showed that 43 
companies carried out share buybacks while the remaining 88 only announced the plan 
but did not proceed with it. For Main Board companies, announcement of the share 
buyback plan seemed to be more significant than the actual buyback. For instance, the 
windows for CAAR (0,+2) and CAAR (0,+60) for the companies announcing a share 
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buyback were 2.97 percent and 14.31 percent, respectively, while for companies with an 
actual buyback the windows were 2.29 percent and 9.03 percent. However, for the 
Second Board, the actual share buyback had a larger effect than just the announcement. 
The price reactions were all significantly higher by 42.31 percent for the post-event 
windows of 15, 30 and 60 days as compared to 31.11 percent when only an 
announcement was made. 
 
Isa, Ghani and Lee (2011) examined the reaction of share prices surrounding the 
actual share buyback executed by companies listed on the Malaysian Stock Exchange 
from 2001 through 2005. Using the market model and the event study methodology, the 
result indicated a significant increase in share prices in a three-day period starting from 
the buyback day. They also found an overall price decrease in the pre-event period that 
suggested that companies timed their share buyback after a period of consecutive price 
decreases. This finding clearly demonstrates the presence of a signalling effect and is 
consistent with the undervaluation hypothesis. The findings also indicated that the share 
buyback programme can be used as an effective tool for price stabilisation. 
 
Ramakrishnan et al. (2007) studied share buyback impacts on share prices within 
Bursa Malaysia jurisdiction. Using the t-test, this study tested for changes in prices and 
the standard deviations of prices before, during and after the share buyback for 1999 
through 2006. A “still water pond analogy” was used to classify the before, during and 
after share buyback periods. The study was restricted to open market buybacks through 
a stockbroker as this is the only buyback method recognised by Bursa Malaysia. The 
authors found positive effects for share prices during and after the buyback as compared 
to before the buyback. The standard deviations for prices also differed significantly 
during the three periods. The average buyback per company in Bursa Malaysia from 
1999 through 2006 is 37 transactions. In view of this high frequency of share buybacks, 
this study construed that company managements used the share buyback as a vehicle to 
signal information to investors. The robust results confirmed this signalling effect. The 
empirical findings supported the undervaluation hypothesis eulogised in the financial 
literature as the primary motive for share buybacks. The findings also showed a 
tremendous increase in share buyback activities for Malaysian companies, as shown in 
Figure A. Malaysian listed companies embarked on share buybacks on a big scale from 
2004 onwards, with a tremendous increase in both considerations paid and buyback 
volume to acquire shares. 
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                                      Source: Adapted from Ramakrishnan et al. (2007) 
 
Figure A 
 
Summary of share buyback between 1999 to 2006 in Malaysia 
 
Shahar and Abdullah (2007) investigated the market reactions to the announcement of a 
share buyback in relation to the fixed-price tender offer arrangement. The price 
reactions of 30 observations involving 21 listed companies surrounding the 
announcement dates were examined using an event study methodology. The market-
adjusted return model (MARM) and the single-index market model (SIMM) were used 
to calculate the abnormal returns. Although many studies in the Western market have 
shown positive abnormal returns, this study found zero abnormal returns gained from 
these announcements. This implies that the stock market in Malaysia was semi-strongly 
efficient. Last, this study did not support any of the implications of the theories. 
 
Wong, Lim and Chong (2011) investigated the share performance of companies 
listed on the Bursa Malaysia Top 100 index from 2006 through 2009 following a share 
buyback between the financial crisis period and the period prior to that in sub-groups 
based on size and book-to-market ratio and the management’s ability to time the market. 
The results showed that for the three event windows surrounding the share buyback, the 
overall CAR was significantly different from zero. The findings indicated that the 
management was able to identify the undervaluation of share price and time the market 
for share buyback. The share price performance also significantly improved after the 
share buyback. Across the market size quartile and BTM quartile, the t-test showed a 
significant difference from zero but not for buyback volume. However, only market size 
in the cross-sectional regression was significantly negatively related to CAR, while 
buyback volume and BTM ratio were not significantly different from zero. The CAR (-
20, -1) also was not significantly different from zero. 
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
A random sample of 20 different companies (observations) was chosen for each year 
from 2007 through 2011. Altogether, 100 different companies (observations) were 
chosen from 2007 through 2011. If another share buyback announcement fell within 
these 61-day windows, the observation was not selected. This avoided the clustering 
effect arising from multiple share buyback announcements. Our study only measures the 
pure effect arising from only one share buyback announcement during these 61-day 
windows. 
 
MARM is a simple method that assumes that a model of equilibrium expected 
returns exists where the average systematic risk is equal to one and the alpha (α) is equal 
to zero. This implies that no estimation of systematic risk or alpha is required. Shahar 
and Abdullah (2007) employed this model. 
 
The actual buyback day is the event day (known as day 0). To obtain the 
abnormal returns, we use the market model. The event window is the 61 days, from day 
-30 to day +30, surrounding the event day. Daily returns of stock were computed using 
the formula below: 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
 
where, 
Ri,t = the daily return of stock for stock i on day t,  
Pi,t = the closing price of stock i on day t,  
Pi,t-1 = the closing price of stock i on day t-1.  
The returns of stock are computed from day –30 to day +30.  
 
Next, we used the Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (now known as FTSE Bursa 
Malaysia KLCI) as the market return’s proxy. The return of the market index was 
calculated as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑚,𝑡 =
𝐶𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1
 
 
where, 
Rm,t = the daily return of market on day t,  
Ci,t = the closing KLCI on day t, 
Ci,t-1 = the closing KLCI on day t-1. 
 
After obtaining both values for the return of stock and return of market for each event 
day, the daily abnormal return for each day t was computed as follows: 
 
ARi,t= Ri,t -Rm,t 
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Next, the daily average abnormal returns (AARt) for a specific day, t was computed by 
adding all the daily abnormal returns for each of the event day t and then dividing the 
figure with the number of observations. 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 / 𝑁𝑡
𝑁
𝑡=1
 
 
Where Nt is the number of observations on day t 
 
Next, the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) surrounding the announcement 
day were calculated by adding up the average abnormal returns (AAR) which is shown 
as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑡
𝑘=𝑡−𝑇
 
 
Where T is the number of event days before day t 
 
A t-statistic was calculated to test the null hypothesis that the daily average abnormal 
returns (AAR) on event day t were equal to zero. This test was carried out in order to 
find if the returns of individual stock were statistically different from zero given their 
distribution about the average. The test can also determine whether the change in stock 
prices due to the share buyback announcement is significant. The equation for the t-test 
for AAR is as shown below: 
 
Ttest for AAR=
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑆𝑡 / (𝑁𝑡)0.5
 
 
where  St = √
∑ (𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡− 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡)
2𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁𝑡−1
 
wherei = 1, 2, 3, ……. N, 
 
A t-statistic was computed after the CAAR has been determined for each observed 
period to test whether the null hypothesis, CAAR over a period of T days is equal to 
zero. 
 
Ttest for CAAR=
[(𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑇)/𝑇]
2
[𝑆𝑡/ (𝑇)0.5]
 
where St = √
∑ [(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑇−(𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑇)/𝑇)]2
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑇−1
 
 
where t = 1, 2, 3, …… T 
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FINDINGS 
 
Returns Analysis for All Observation  
 
Figure 1 shows the analysis of abnormal returns for 100 observations from 2007 through 
2011, with the event day (day 0) defined as the actual buyback day.  
 
 
Figure 1  Graph of CAAR surrounding the announcement of share buybacks for all 
100 observations from 2007 to 2011 
    
The overall results for 2007 through 2011 show some upward effects on share prices 
after a buyback announcement. Starting from day 0, which is the event day, the CAAR 
trends upward for about 12 days and then stabilises until day +24. Thereafter, the CAAR 
continues a slight upward trend until day +29. This shows a positive wealth effect 
arising from the announcement. One can conclude that the market generally responded 
favourably to the announcement of share buybacks.  
 
Figure 1 also indicates that about 20 days before the event day, prices trended 
downwards. This finding may indicate that companies tend to plan and execute their 
buybacks after a period of decrease in share prices. 
 
In Panel 1 of Table 1, except for day -22 and day -2, the t-test shows that none of 
the AAR is significantly different from zero at the level of 5 percent during these 61-day 
periods. Panel 2 of Table 1 also shows that none of the CAAR’s event periods is 
significantly different from zero at the level of 5 percent. The post-event period CAAR 
(0, +30) shows a positive value of 3.469 percent as compared to a value of -1.566 
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percent shown in the pre-event period CAAR (-30, -1). This corroborates that share 
buybacks have a positive impact on share prices.  
 
The results are consistent with the signalling hypothesis and with many prior 
studies (Isa et al., 2011; Chan et al., 2004; Koerniadi et al., 2007). The market interprets 
companies’ decision to buy back their shares as a positive signal. Generally, the result 
indicates that a share buyback can be a useful devise for price stabilisation if properly 
executed, consistent with Isa, Ghani and Lee (2011). 
 
Table 1  Average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAAR) surrounding the share buyback of companies for all 
observations from 2007 to 2011 (N=100) 
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Panel 1: Daily AAR and CAAR relative to actual share buyback day
Day AAR (%) AAR t-test CAAR (%) Day AAR (%) AAR t-test CAAR (%)
-30 0.0008      0.0033       0.0008              0 0.1342      0.3699      (1.4521)         
-29 0.0600      0.2208       0.0608              1 0.5429      1.8052      (0.9092)         
-28 0.0608      0.3013       0.1216              2 0.0492      0.2056      (0.8600)         
-27 (0.0958)    (0.3357)     0.0259              3 0.5635      1.6582      (0.2965)         
-26 0.1106      0.3308       0.1365              4 0.6096      1.7969      0.3131          
-25 (0.4061)    (1.1308)     (0.2696)            5 0.3173      1.6289      0.6304          
-24 0.0504      0.1971       (0.2191)            6 (0.1369)    (0.5354)    0.4935          
-23 (0.2940)    (1.2666)     (0.5131)            7 (0.3358)    (1.7188)    0.1578          
-22 0.8224      2.3627       * 0.3093              8 0.8145      1.8418      0.9723          
-21 (0.0784)    (0.1991)     0.2309              9 0.0713      0.2237      1.0436          
-20 (0.1795)    (0.8579)     0.0514              10 (0.0889)    (0.3767)    0.9547          
-19 (0.1395)    (0.8540)     (0.0881)            11 0.4925      1.4301      1.4472          
-18 (0.3264)    (1.3994)     (0.4146)            12 0.0338      0.0802      1.4810          
-17 0.3693      1.2334       (0.0453)            13 0.2000      1.0270      1.6810          
-16 (0.2977)    (1.0958)     (0.3430)            14 (0.5413)    (1.7124)    1.1398          
-15 (0.2101)    (0.7754)     (0.5531)            15 0.0942      0.3278      1.2340          
-14 (0.0223)    (0.0692)     (0.5753)            16 0.7679      1.9525      2.0019          
-13 (0.0574)    (0.1440)     (0.6328)            17 (0.2958)    (0.9825)    1.7061          
-12 (0.0418)    (0.1616)     (0.6746)            18 0.2309      0.6920      1.9371          
-11 (0.1037)    (0.4620)     (0.7783)            19 (0.1764)    (0.4757)    1.7606          
-10 (0.2041)    (0.7115)     (0.9824)            20 0.0752      0.2695      1.8358          
-9 (0.2675)    (0.8413)     (1.2499)            21 0.1080      0.5251      1.9438          
-8 (0.1951)    (0.5238)     (1.4450)            22 (0.7416)    (1.8283)    1.2023          
-7 0.4482      1.1770       (0.9968)            23 (0.1412)    (0.5836)    1.0610          
-6 0.3657      0.7162       (0.6310)            24 (0.1565)    (0.6526)    0.9046          
-5 (0.4809)    (1.7941)     (1.1119)            25 0.5742      1.4905      1.4787          
-4 0.0603      0.1829       (1.0516)            26 0.3673      1.1736      1.8460          
-3 0.4133      1.1399       (0.6383)            27 0.0356      0.1175      1.8816          
-2 (1.0933)    (2.7205)     * (1.7315)            28 0.1767      0.7632      2.0583          
-1 0.1452      0.4770       (1.5863)            29 0.2757      1.2729      2.3340          
30 (0.4513)    (1.1373)    1.8827          
Panel 2: CAAR over different event periods
CAAR t1,t2 CAAR (%) CAAR t-test
Day -30 to -1 (1.5658)            (0.8303)    
Day 0 to 2 0.7263              1.5889      
Day 3 to 30 2.7427              1.3359      
Day 0 to 30 3.4690              1.8299      
Day -30 to 30 1.9032              0.6629      
Note : * significant at 0.05 level
Int. Journal of Economics and Management 9(2):312 – 340 (2015) 
 
326 
 
Year by year analysis from 2007 to 2011 
 
Returns Analysis for 2007 
 
For 2007, the period of the study coincides with the subprime crisis in the US. Figure 2 
indicates that about 15 days before the event day, prices tended to trend downwards. 
Beginning from the event day, the CAAR drops slightly for 2 days and then recovers 
slightly for about 4 days before stabilising until day +22. Thereafter, the CAAR 
continues to trend downwards until day +30. This result could be due to the effects of 
the subprime crisis in the US on the Malaysian stock market. During these periods, the 
results show that the actual share buybacks by companies, at the most, can only support 
and stabilise the share prices for about 16 days. The CAAR continues its downward 
trend again after day +22. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 2 Graph of CAAR surrounding the announcement of share buybacks for 20 
observations for year 2007 
 
For Panel 1 of Table 2, the t-test shows that none of the AAR is significantly different 
from zero at the level of 5 percent during these 61-day periods. This might imply that 
when the market was bearish the reactions to the share buyback announcements were 
subdued and insignificant. Except for the event period from day 0 to day +2, which is 
significant at the level of 1 percent, Panel 2 of Table 2 shows that none of the CAAR’s 
event periods is significantly different from zero at the level of 5 percent. This result 
also shows that share buybacks have the temporary effect of supporting a decline in 
share prices of companies in a weakening market before the continuation of a downtrend 
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in prices. The post-event period CAAR (0, +30) shows a smaller negative value of 1.234 
percent as compared to a larger negative value of 4.148 percent during the pre-event 
period CAAR (-30, -1). We reason that the share buyback signalling effect may not be 
able to continuously support the selling pressure in a downtrend market. Furthermore, 
the market participants may also pay less attention to such announcements to support the 
market during those times. 
 
 
Table 2  Average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAAR) surrounding  share buyback of 
companies for 20 observations in 2007 (N=20) 
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Returns Analysis for 2008 
For 2008, the period of the study corresponds to the recovery of the subprime crisis in 
the US. Figure 3 indicates that before the event day, prices tend to stabilise. Starting 
from day 0, the CAAR trends upward for about 12 days and then stabilises until day 
+29. After day +29, the price may fall. Generally, for 2008, the CAAR trends upward 
after the event day. This result could be due to the effects of recovery in the stock 
market. 
 
Panel 1: Daily AAR and CAAR relative to actual share buyback day
Day AAR (%) AAR t-test CAAR (%) Day AAR (%) AAR t-test CAAR (%)
-30 (0.9269)    (1.7603)     (0.9269)            0 (0.1859)    (0.2212)    (5.9155)         
-29 (0.3216)    (0.6779)     (1.2485)            1 (0.1734)    (0.2815)    (6.0889)         
-28 (1.2485)    0.4097       (2.4970)            2 (0.2664)    (0.4505)    (6.3553)         
-27 0.0541      0.0894       (2.4430)            3 1.0582      1.0942      (5.2971)         
-26 (0.3951)    (0.8587)     (2.8380)            4 0.5387      0.6154      (4.7584)         
-25 0.1797      0.3212       (2.6583)            5 0.1619      0.2705      (4.5965)         
-24 (0.0158)    (0.0264)     (2.6741)            6 0.0635      0.1495      (4.5331)         
-23 0.1433      0.2791       (2.5308)            7 (0.7302)    (1.8011)    (5.2633)         
-22 0.0958      0.1555       (2.4350)            8 0.3568      0.3688      (4.9065)         
-21 (0.3394)    (0.9899)     (2.7744)            9 0.1275      0.2600      (4.7789)         
-20 (0.2121)    (0.5772)     (2.9865)            10 (0.6151)    (1.3165)    (5.3941)         
-19 (0.2556)    (0.7132)     (3.2421)            11 (0.2460)    (0.4674)    (5.6401)         
-18 0.4847      0.5866       (2.7575)            12 0.9651      0.8589      (4.6749)         
-17 0.3032      0.4985       (2.4542)            13 0.1108      0.2361      (4.5641)         
-16 (0.2089)    (0.4254)     (2.6632)            14 (0.8059)    (1.7593)    (5.3700)         
-15 (0.4294)    (1.0954)     (3.0926)            15 (0.0974)    (0.1575)    (5.4675)         
-14 0.0772      0.1423       (3.0153)            16 0.9893      0.7927      (4.4781)         
-13 (0.8005)    (1.8975)     (3.8158)            17 (0.2258)    (0.2399)    (4.7040)         
-12 0.1566      0.2341       (3.6592)            18 0.0217      0.0265      (4.6823)         
-11 (0.7968)    (1.6931)     (4.4560)            19 0.2298      0.4308      (4.4525)         
-10 0.4922      0.8460       (3.9638)            20 (0.5448)    (1.2120)    (4.9973)         
-9 (0.9584)    (1.4407)     (4.9222)            21 0.1778      0.2627      (4.8195)         
-8 (0.4263)    (0.7470)     (5.3484)            22 (0.7323)    (1.7963)    (5.5518)         
-7 0.9497      1.0568       (4.3987)            23 (0.3455)    (0.6919)    (5.8973)         
-6 1.2776      0.7507       (3.1212)            24 (0.6048)    (0.9648)    (6.5021)         
-5 (0.1013)    (0.1978)     (3.2225)            25 (0.2370)    (0.3522)    (6.7391)         
-4 (1.0530)    (2.2507)     (4.2755)            26 0.0404      0.0990      (6.6988)         
-3 1.0699      1.0303       (3.2055)            27 0.0430      0.0610      (6.6557)         
-2 (1.7077)    (1.9741)     (4.9133)            28 0.3807      0.5933      (6.2750)         
-1 (0.8163)    (0.7939)     (5.7295)            29 (0.4478)    (1.0841)    (6.7228)         
30 (0.2411)    (0.4915)    (6.9639)         
Panel 2: CAAR over different event periods
CAAR t1,t2 CAAR (%) CAAR t-test
Day -30 to -1 (4.1482)            (1.1521)    
Day 0 to 2 (0.6257)            (7.1580)    **
Day 3 to 30 (0.6087)            (0.2253)    
Day 0 to 30 (1.2344)            (0.3775)    
Day -30 to 30 (5.3825)            (1.1991)    
Note : ** significant at 0.01 level
Int. Journal of Economics and Management 9(2):312 – 340 (2015) 
 
329 
 
  
 
Figure 3 Graph of CAAR surrounding the announcement of share buybacks for 
20 observations for year 2008 
 
For Panel 1 of Table 3, except for day +5, the t-test shows that none of the AAR is 
significantly different from zero at the level of 5 percent during these 61-day periods. 
Panel 2 of Table 3 also shows that none of the CAAR’s event periods is significantly 
different from zero. The post-event period CAAR (0, +30) shows a larger positive value 
of 7.697 percent as compared to a smaller positive value of 1.907 percent shown in the 
pre-event period CAAR (-30, -1). This reveals that share buybacks had a strong positive 
impact on share prices during the recovery period. 
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Table 3  Average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAAR) surrounding share buyback of 
companies for 20 observations in 2008 (N=20) 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel 1: Daily AAR and CAAR relative to actual share buyback day
Day AAR (%) AAR t-test CAAR (%) Day AAR (%) AAR t-test CAAR (%)
-30 0.2601      0.4328       0.2601              0 (0.7695)    (0.7054)    0.5475          
-29 (0.4347)    (0.5867)     (0.1745)            1 1.4031      1.5858      1.9506          
-28 (0.1745)    0.7728       (0.3490)            2 0.9065      1.2790      2.8571          
-27 0.2163      0.2366       (0.1327)            3 1.4497      1.8733      4.3067          
-26 (0.7780)    (0.8331)     (0.9107)            4 0.4945      0.3977      4.8012          
-25 (1.4768)    (1.9826)     (2.3876)            5 0.6676      2.2772      * 5.4688          
-24 0.7897      1.3319       (1.5979)            6 (0.3217)    (0.4078)    5.1471          
-23 (0.6483)    (1.0280)     (2.2461)            7 (0.2735)    (0.5136)    4.8737          
-22 0.6879      0.8594       (1.5583)            8 1.8083      1.4381      6.6820          
-21 0.8677      1.5107       (0.6906)            9 (0.3917)    (0.4318)    6.2903          
-20 0.2344      0.3161       (0.4562)            10 0.4244      0.7402      6.7146          
-19 (0.1828)    (0.3228)     (0.6390)            11 2.4923      1.6779      9.2069          
-18 (0.0687)    (0.1656)     (0.7077)            12 (0.2065)    (0.1684)    9.0005          
-17 0.1952      0.3123       (0.5125)            13 0.7106      2.0505      9.7111          
-16 (1.1197)    (1.7364)     (1.6322)            14 (0.6511)    (1.0216)    9.0601          
-15 (0.6804)    (1.3915)     (2.3126)            15 (0.0935)    (0.1015)    8.9666          
-14 (0.6102)    (0.7517)     (2.9228)            16 0.5288      0.7542      9.4954          
-13 1.8779      1.5234       (1.0448)            17 (1.1181)    (1.6591)    8.3773          
-12 (0.7949)    (1.0578)     (1.8398)            18 0.1683      0.1978      8.5456          
-11 0.2710      0.5740       (1.5687)            19 0.2121      0.8131      8.7577          
-10 (0.2334)    (0.3537)     (1.8021)            20 0.7577      0.7904      9.5154          
-9 0.3293      0.6608       (1.4728)            21 (0.3181)    (0.5151)    9.1973          
-8 0.1287      0.2337       (1.3441)            22 (1.5613)    (0.9892)    7.6360          
-7 0.5335      0.4062       (0.8107)            23 (0.1011)    (0.1835)    7.5349          
-6 1.0393      0.5676       0.2287              24 0.5447      1.4193      8.0797          
-5 0.5029      0.9623       0.7316              25 0.9889      0.7182      9.0686          
-4 1.1388      0.8458       1.8704              26 0.4053      0.3163      9.4739          
-3 (0.7910)    (0.7248)     1.0795              27 1.5013      1.4365      10.9752        
-2 (0.6060)    (1.0503)     0.4735              28 (0.2634)    (0.4175)    10.7118        
-1 0.8435      1.2251       1.3170              29 0.1648      0.3889      10.8766        
30 (1.8625)    (1.1271)    9.0141          
Panel 2: CAAR over different event periods
CAAR t1,t2 CAAR (%) CAAR t-test
Day -30 to -1 1.9066              0.4592      
Day 0 to 2 1.5401              0.7811      
Day 3 to 30 6.1570              1.2241      
Day 0 to 30 7.6971              2.0162      
Day -30 to 30 9.6038              1.4294      
Note : * significant at 0.05 level
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Returns Analysis for 2009 
 
For 2009, Figure 4 indicates that before the event day, prices tend to stabilise. Starting 
on day 0, the CAAR trends upwards for about 10 days, then moves downwards slightly 
until day +14 before continuing its upward trend until day +26. Thereafter, the CAAR 
stabilises until day +29 and the price may fall after day +29. 
 
  
 
Figure 4 Graph of CAAR surrounding the announcement of share buybacks for 
20 observations for year 2009 
 
For Panel 1 of Table 4, the t-test shows that none of the AAR and CAAR is significantly 
different from zero at the level of 5 percent during these 61-day periods. Panel 2 of 
Table 4 also shows that none of the CAAR’s event periods is significantly different from 
zero. The post-event period CAAR (0, +30) shows a larger positive value of 6.045 
percent as compared to a smaller positive value of 0.1004 percent shown in the pre-
event period CAAR (-30, -1). This again reveals that the share buybacks have a positive 
but insignificant impact on share prices. This result is consistent with the result obtained 
for 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
-30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
CAAR
CAAR
Days Relative to the Announcement 
Int. Journal of Economics and Management 9(2):312 – 340 (2015) 
 
332 
 
 
Table 4 Average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAAR) surrounding share buyback of 
companies for 20 observations in 2009 (N=20) 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel 1: Daily AAR and CAAR relative to actual share buyback day
Day AAR (%) AAR t-test CAAR (%) Day AAR (%) AAR t-test CAAR (%)
-30 0.4101      0.9823       0.4101              0 0.0023      0.0058      1.0292          
-29 0.3368      0.4295       0.7469              1 1.2537      1.8164      2.2829          
-28 0.7469      (0.2334)     1.4937              2 (0.3499)    (0.6429)    1.9330          
-27 (0.2174)    (0.2748)     1.2763              3 (0.0179)    (0.0304)    1.9150          
-26 (0.1561)    (0.2487)     1.1203              4 1.0103      1.7344      2.9253          
-25 (0.2541)    (0.5409)     0.8661              5 0.1429      0.3970      3.0682          
-24 (0.0897)    (0.1756)     0.7764              6 (0.0089)    (0.0203)    3.0593          
-23 (0.1679)    (0.2544)     0.6085              7 0.0090      0.0146      3.0683          
-22 0.2326      0.4115       0.8412              8 1.2940      1.8525      4.3623          
-21 0.2347      0.3340       1.0759              9 (0.4152)    (0.6037)    3.9472          
-20 (0.4252)    (0.8336)     0.6507              10 0.2034      0.3427      4.1506          
-19 (0.1227)    (0.3958)     0.5280              11 (0.6996)    (1.0334)    3.4510          
-18 (0.6089)    (0.7964)     (0.0809)            12 (0.8327)    (0.7124)    2.6183          
-17 0.8836      0.9707       0.8027              13 0.3357      0.5918      2.9540          
-16 0.4319      0.5557       1.2347              14 (0.6297)    (0.8111)    2.3242          
-15 (0.4180)    (0.4317)     0.8166              15 0.4808      0.8777      2.8050          
-14 (0.4521)    (0.8101)     0.3645              16 1.2315      1.0733      4.0364          
-13 0.2155      0.5604       0.5800              17 0.2877      0.6840      4.3242          
-12 0.3964      0.6670       0.9764              18 1.3393      1.4199      5.6635          
-11 0.2830      0.5380       1.2594              19 (0.2619)    (0.1554)    5.4016          
-10 (0.9212)    (0.8362)     0.3382              20 0.3289      0.4134      5.7306          
-9 (0.5936)    (1.0054)     (0.2554)            21 (0.1672)    (0.5735)    5.5633          
-8 0.6858      1.6691       0.4303              22 (0.9192)    (0.7989)    4.6441          
-7 0.6595      0.6577       1.0898              23 0.7465      0.8951      5.3906          
-6 (0.0297)    (0.1025)     1.0601              24 0.4423      0.5404      5.8330          
-5 (0.2059)    (0.4856)     0.8542              25 1.1485      1.0453      6.9815          
-4 0.4507      0.7968       1.3050              26 1.6021      2.0314      8.5836          
-3 0.2675      0.6170       1.5724              27 (1.5401)    (1.6982)    7.0435          
-2 (1.1681)    (1.5404)     0.4043              28 0.4448      0.6918      7.4884          
-1 0.6226      1.5546       1.0269              29 0.3652      0.6633      7.8536          
30 (0.7817)    (1.0444)    7.0719          
Panel 2: CAAR over different event periods
CAAR t1,t2 CAAR (%) CAAR t-test
Day -30 to -1 0.1004              0.0374      
Day 0 to 2 0.9061              0.6207      
Day 3 to 30 5.1389              1.2497      
Day 0 to 30 6.0450              1.5548      
Day -30 to 30 6.1454              1.2119      
Note : * significant at 0.05 level
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Returns Analysis for 2010 
For 2010, Figure 5 indicates that about 10 days prior to the event day, prices tend to 
trend downwards. Beginning from the event day, the CAAR stabilises until day +30.  
  
 
Figure 5 Graph of CAAR surrounding the announcement of share buybacks for 20 
observations for year 2010 
 
For Panel 1 of Table 5, the t-test shows that, except for day -18, none of the AAR and 
CAAR is significantly different from zero at the level of 5 percent during these 61-day 
periods. Panel 2 of Table 5 also shows that none of the CAAR’s event periods is 
significantly different from zero. In 2010, the results suggest that the overall reactions to 
the share buyback announcement were insignificant. The post-event period CAAR (0, 
+30) shows a positive value of 2.588 percent as compared to a negative value of 5.883 
percent shown in the pre-event period CAAR (-30, -1). The result shows that share 
buybacks have a minor positive and insignificant impact on share prices. 
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Table 5  Average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAAR) surrounding the  share buyback of companies for 20 
observations in 2010 (N=20) 
 
 
 
Panel 1: Daily AAR and CAAR relative to actual share buyback day
Day AAR (%) AAR t-test CAAR (%) Day AAR (%) AAR t-test CAAR (%)
-30 (0.1811)    (0.3933)     (0.1811)            0 1.5167      1.4898      (2.4489)         
-29 1.2573      2.1464       1.0762              1 0.0728      0.1167      (2.3761)         
-28 1.0762      (1.6472)     2.1524              2 0.1856      0.3745      (2.1905)         
-27 0.1933      0.5030       2.3457              3 (0.5985)    (0.5917)    (2.7890)         
-26 1.4635      1.2909       3.8093              4 0.7224      1.1682      (2.0666)         
-25 (0.3667)    (0.2392)     3.4426              5 0.5507      0.9658      (1.5160)         
-24 (0.3152)    (0.3575)     3.1274              6 (1.0401)    (2.0925)    (2.5561)         
-23 (0.8582)    (1.4979)     2.2692              7 0.0279      0.0868      (2.5282)         
-22 2.7052      1.9548       4.9744              8 (0.5754)    (0.6607)    (3.1035)         
-21 (1.5346)    (0.9208)     3.4398              9 0.9856      1.7744      (2.1179)         
-20 (0.6940)    (1.6168)     2.7458              10 (0.2718)    (0.4733)    (2.3897)         
-19 (0.4850)    (1.2471)     2.2608              11 0.5230      0.8501      (1.8667)         
-18 (0.5848)    (2.5203)     * 1.6761              12 0.8829      1.1272      (0.9839)         
-17 0.5551      0.9427       2.2311              13 (0.6586)    (1.8830)    (1.6425)         
-16 (0.0011)    (0.0020)     2.2300              14 (0.3859)    (0.3489)    (2.0284)         
-15 0.5482      0.7201       2.7782              15 0.1146      0.1560      (1.9138)         
-14 0.3832      0.3134       3.1614              16 (0.0737)    (0.1578)    (1.9875)         
-13 (1.9538)    (1.5454)     1.2077              17 (0.4138)    (0.4404)    (2.4012)         
-12 0.1020      0.1950       1.3096              18 (0.0965)    (0.1289)    (2.4977)         
-11 0.1375      0.2369       1.4471              19 0.2273      0.5121      (2.2705)         
-10 0.2369      0.4699       1.6840              20 (0.2679)    (0.6941)    (2.5384)         
-9 (0.0900)    (0.0724)     1.5941              21 0.4921      0.9233      (2.0462)         
-8 (2.0731)    (1.3017)     (0.4791)            22 (0.4655)    (1.0736)    (2.5117)         
-7 (0.7307)    (1.7605)     (1.2098)            23 (0.4442)    (1.2856)    (2.9560)         
-6 (0.1632)    (0.2860)     (1.3730)            24 (0.2278)    (0.6955)    (3.1838)         
-5 (1.5987)    (1.7199)     (2.9717)            25 0.4141      1.1109      (2.7697)         
-4 (0.7080)    (1.3378)     (3.6797)            26 0.0547      0.1768      (2.7150)         
-3 1.7227      1.6560       (1.9570)            27 (0.0786)    (0.3284)    (2.7935)         
-2 (1.5387)    (1.0033)     (3.4957)            28 0.5358      1.4380      (2.2577)         
-1 (0.4700)    (0.7238)     (3.9656)            29 0.3403      0.6404      (1.9173)         
30 0.5400      0.8080      (1.3773)         
Panel 2: CAAR over different event periods
CAAR t1,t2 CAAR (%) CAAR t-test
Day -30 to -1 (5.8827)            (1.0040)    
Day 0 to 2 1.7752              1.2762      
Day 3 to 30 0.8132              0.2984      
Day 0 to 30 2.5884              0.4184      
Day -30 to 30 (3.2944)            (0.4943)    
Note : * significant at 0.05 level
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Returns Analysis for 2011 
For 2011, Figure 6 indicates that before the event day, prices tend to stabilise. Starting 
from day 0, the CAAR trends upwards for about 16 days, then trends downwards until 
day +24 before continuing its upward trend until day +30. 
  
 
Figure 6  Graph of CAAR surrounding the announcement of share 
buybacks for 20 observations for year 2011 
 
For Panel 1 of Table 6, the t-test shows that none of the AAR and CAAR is significantly 
different from zero at the level of 5 percent during these 61-day periods. Panel 2 of 
Table 6 also shows that none of the CAAR’s event periods is significantly different from 
zero. The post-event period CAAR (0, +30) shows a larger positive value of 2.249 
percent as compared to a smaller positive value of 0.195 percent shown in the pre-event 
period CAAR (-30, -1). This again shows that share buybacks have a positive but 
insignificant impact on share prices. This result is consistent with the results obtained 
for 2008, 2009 and 2010. 
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Table 6 Average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAAR) surrounding the share buyback 
of companies for 20 observations in 2011 (N=20) 
 
 
 
 
Panel 1: Daily AAR and CAAR relative to actual share buyback day
Day AAR (%) AAR t-test CAAR (%) Day AAR (%) AAR t-test CAAR (%)
-30 0.4417      0.6764       0.4417              0 0.1074      0.1492      (0.4728)         
-29 (0.5376)    (0.9014)     (0.0960)            1 0.1581      0.2691      (0.3146)         
-28 (0.0960)    1.4434       (0.1919)            2 (0.2297)    (0.4879)    (0.5443)         
-27 (0.7252)    (1.2631)     (0.9171)            3 0.9259      1.8212      0.3816          
-26 0.4186      0.7691       (0.4985)            4 0.2824      0.8922      0.6640          
-25 (0.1124)    (0.3205)     (0.6109)            5 0.0637      0.1342      0.7276          
-24 (0.1167)    (0.4233)     (0.7275)            6 0.6226      0.8271      1.3503          
-23 0.0612      0.1458       (0.6663)            7 (0.7120)    (1.7437)    0.6383          
-22 0.3905      1.2579       (0.2758)            8 1.1888      1.0251      1.8271          
-21 0.3797      0.6506       0.1039              9 0.0502      0.0503      1.8773          
-20 0.1994      0.5750       0.3032              10 (0.1853)    (0.3444)    1.6921          
-19 0.3484      0.9679       0.6516              11 0.3928      1.0305      2.0848          
-18 (0.8545)    (1.8206)     (0.2028)            12 (0.6399)    (1.2806)    1.4449          
-17 (0.0909)    (0.1242)     (0.2938)            13 0.5017      0.9470      1.9467          
-16 (0.5905)    (0.8263)     (0.8843)            14 (0.2337)    (0.4388)    1.7130          
-15 (0.0707)    (0.1856)     (0.9550)            15 0.0666      0.1542      1.7796          
-14 0.4905      1.4709       (0.4646)            16 1.1639      1.5518      2.9434          
-13 0.3736      0.4629       (0.0909)            17 (0.0090)    (0.0314)    2.9345          
-12 (0.0689)    (0.1336)     (0.1599)            18 (0.2783)    (0.7358)    2.6562          
-11 (0.4135)    (0.7408)     (0.5733)            19 (1.2893)    (1.9879)    1.3669          
-10 (0.5951)    (1.4482)     (1.1684)            20 0.1018      0.2524      1.4687          
-9 (0.0249)    (0.0771)     (1.1933)            21 0.3556      1.4975      1.8243          
-8 0.7097      1.3603       (0.4836)            22 (0.0296)    (0.0578)    1.7947          
-7 0.8291      1.8269       0.3455              23 (0.5619)    (1.0870)    1.2328          
-6 (0.2953)    (0.4743)     0.0502              24 (0.9368)    (1.8480)    0.2961          
-5 (1.0014)    (1.5159)     (0.9512)            25 0.5563      1.2854      0.8524          
-4 0.4730      1.2470       (0.4783)            26 (0.2660)    (0.8175)    0.5863          
-3 (0.2024)    (0.4545)     (0.6807)            27 0.2521      0.9567      0.8384          
-2 (0.4459)    (0.9332)     (1.1266)            28 (0.2142)    (0.4591)    0.6242          
-1 0.5464      1.0522       (0.5802)            29 0.9557      1.6919      1.5799          
30 0.0890      0.1564      1.6689          
Panel 2: CAAR over different event periods
CAAR t1,t2 CAAR (%) CAAR t-test
Day -30 to -1 0.1949              0.0715      
Day 0 to 2 0.0359              0.0983      
Day 3 to 30 2.2132              0.6935      
Day 0 to 30 2.2491              0.4905      
Day -30 to 30 2.4439              0.5850      
Note : * significant at 0.05 level
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This study analyses the reaction of share prices around the announcement of share 
buybacks by Malaysian companies listed on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia for 
2007 through 2011. Overall, the CAAR, which was used to measure the wealth effect, 
shows an uptrend for about 12 days after the event day before stabilising. The result 
shows a positive wealth effect arising from the announcement, but it is not statistically 
significant. One can conclude that the market generally responded favourably to the 
announcement of share buybacks. 
 
Before the day of the announcement of the buyback, there was an overall 
decrease in share prices. This indicates that companies tend to plan and execute their 
buybacks after a period of consecutive drops in share prices. The result also indicates 
that the price may fall after day +29.  
 
We also found that when the market is bearish, share buybacks have the 
temporary effect of supporting a decline in share prices before the continuation of down 
trending prices. We reasoned that the share buyback signalling effect may not be able to 
continuously support the selling pressure in a downtrend market. Furthermore, the 
market participants may also pay less attention to such announcement to support the 
market during those times. During the recovery period from 2008 onwards, we found 
that the results were quite consistent; this implies that share buybacks have a positive 
impact on share prices, but it is not statistically significant.  
 
Generally, the results were consistent with the signalling hypothesis in which the 
share buyback announcements reflect management’s assessment that the value of the 
company is greater than the current market price suggests. The results also indicate that 
share buybacks, if properly executed, are a useful device for price stabilisation and serve 
as a market signal. This is consistent with Isa, Ghani and Lee (2011). 
 
 
Implication of the Study 
 
Our study has implications for at least two parties: companies and investors. Companies 
should be aware that share buybacks can be a useful device for price stabilisation if they 
are properly executed. As for investors, share buybacks may be able to increase their 
wealth as the findings indicate a general upward movement in share prices after the 
announcement date of a buyback. However, the movement is statistically insignificant. 
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